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Transparency and the Protection of Trade Secrets in
the Fracturing World: The Case for Upfront
Substantiation and Immediate Evaluation of
Fracturing Fluid Trade Secret Claims in Louisiana
INTRODUCTION
“After years of talking about it, we’re finally poised to control our own
energy future.”1
Due to advances in technology, the future of the oil business within
the United States is shining bright. Drilling companies now employ
unconventional horizontal hydraulic fracturing2 to recover oil and natural
gas from shale formations previously perceived to be economically
unviable.3 The process of hydraulic fracturing spurs production in oil and
gas wells by creating or restoring small fractures in the shale formation.4
These fractures result from the high-pressure injection of a mixture of
water, sand, and chemical additives.5
Typically, oil and natural gas companies keep the exact identity of
fracturing mixtures confidential, citing trade secret protection over what the
companies perceive to be proprietary information.6 However, this
confidentiality has led to public backlash.7 Several states have enacted
mandatory disclosure requirements in response to the growing support for
compelled transparency relating to the chemicals included in the mixtures.8
By and large, these regulations still limit disclosure of what the public wants
to access most—the exact identity and quantity of the chemicals that make up
the additive portion of the fracturing fluid mixture.9

Copyright 2016, by MARCUS ADAMS.
1. President Barack Obama, State of the Union Address (Feb. 12, 2013).
2. For the purposes of this comment, the terms “hydraulic fracturing” and
“fracturing” will be used interchangeably to mean, “unconventional horizontal
hydraulic fracturing.”
3. See Hydraulic Fracturing: The Process, FRACFOCUS, http://fracfocus.org
/hydraulic-fracturing-how-it-works/hydraulic-fracturing-process [http://perma.cc
/QD34-W3CC] (last visited Sept. 11, 2014).
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. See Keith B. Hall, Hydraulic Fracturing: Trade Secrets and the Mandatory
Disclosure of Fracturing Water Composition, 49 IDAHO L. REV. 399, 406 (2013).
7. See Unchecked Fracking Threatens Health, Water Supplies, NAT. RES.
DEF. COUNCIL, http://www.nrdc.org/energy/gasdrilling/ [http://perma.cc/758V8TVM] (last visited Jan. 21, 2015).
8. See Hall, supra note 6, at 406–07.
9. See Fracking Disclosure Rules, ORRICK, http://reaction.orrick.com
/reaction/ebooks/FrackingDisclosureRules/index.html [http://perma.cc/K296M26C] (last visited Oct. 12, 2014).
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In most cases, companies can cite trade secret protection to avoid
disclosing this allegedly proprietary information.10 Even in mandatory
disclosure states, overbroad trade secret protections often allow companies
to avoid divulgence of specific chemical information. In addition, many of
those states lack a process by which to evaluate trade secret claims unless
challenged explicitly by a third party.11 Consequently, the newly enacted
regulations have not appeased proponents of full, mandatory disclosure.
Like many other states in the face of this public pressure, Louisiana
enacted a mandatory disclosure regulation for the ingredients of fracturing
fluid mixtures.12 Although a step in the right direction, Louisiana’s
regulatory scheme nonetheless remains flawed, providing companies with
a very general trade secret protection provision that lacks any form of
immediate oversight.13 As a result, the regulation gives companies a clear
path around actual disclosure.
While a company surely has the right to protect its proprietary
information from the inquiring eyes of its competitors, reasonable
prudence demands that—in light of the potentially hazardous nature of the
chemicals involved in fracturing—some process exists to evaluate trade
secret claims at the time they are made, rather than only following a third
party challenge. In order to protect this sensitive balance, Louisiana must
adopt a comprehensive scheme requiring upfront justification for a trade
secret claim and must develop an evaluation process to be carried out by a
regulatory agency at the time each claim is made. To effectuate that
process, legislators should look to analogous schemes in other states, such
as the one adopted by Wyoming, for guidance on how to amend
Louisiana’s current regulatory scheme.
This comment commences with a foundational survey of trade secret
law and a discussion of the hydraulic fracturing process, in Part I. Part II
then discusses the sociopolitical movement pressing for mandatory
disclosure of the compositional make-up of fracturing fluid mixtures.
Next, Part III provides an analysis of the benefits and shortcomings of the
current Louisiana regulation and its federal counterpart, the
Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) Toxics Release Inventory
(TRI) process, primarily focusing on the trade secret provisions of each.
Part IV discusses the advantages of a more comprehensive process for
trade secret claim evaluation, and Part V analyzes a model system in
Wyoming. Lastly, Part VI outlines a proposed revision of Louisiana’s
10. Id.
11. See Matthew McFeeley, State Hydraulic Fracturing Disclosure Rules and
Enforcement: A Comparison, NAT. RES. DEF. COUNCIL (July 2012), http: //www.nrdc
.org/energy/files/Fracking-Disclosure-IB.pdf [http://perma.cc/BM7T-26ZL].
12. LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 43, pt. xix, § 118 (2013).
13. Id.
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trade secret exemption regulation to balance the need for disclosure on the
public’s end with the rights of companies to keep proprietary information
confidential.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Trade Secrets
A trade secret is any piece of economically valuable information that
provides an entity with a competitive advantage over its competitors and
for which the entity makes reasonable efforts to maintain confidentiality.14
The actual origin of trade secret protection is somewhat debatable.
Whether traced back to Roman law with the Actio Servi Corrupti,15 to the
common law of nineteenth century England, or to somewhere in
between16—it is clear that trade secrets law appeared in United States
jurisprudence as early as 1868.17
Today, all fifty states protect trade secrets, giving the original owner
legal recourse against those who misappropriate the confidential
information.18 The Congressional Research Service found, “Trade secret
law protects secret, valuable business information from misappropriation
by others. Subject matter ranging from marketing data to manufacturing
know-how may be protected under the trade secret laws.”19 Whether it be
the recipe for the Colonel’s fried chicken or the formula for WD-40, a
trade secret is tremendously valuable to the company that invested the time
and money to research and develop it.
While the exact definition of what constitutes a trade secret is
governed by state law and therefore differs in the precise language
depending on the jurisdiction, the Uniform Trade Secrets Act’s (UTSA)
definition is fundamental to most states’ laws. The UTSA has been

14. See Black’s Law Dictionary 1724 (10th ed. 2014); see also Roger M.
Milgrim & Eric E. Bensen, Milgrim on Trade Secrets §1.01 (Matthew Bender & Co,
2014).
15. A. ARTHUR SCHILLER, AN AMERICAN EXPERIENCE IN ROMAN LAW 1–9
(Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht 1971); see also Alan Watson, Trade Secrets and Roman
Law: The Myth Exploded, 11 TUL. EUR. & CIV. L.F. 19 (1996) (for an argument
against this theory).
16. See John Cavicchi, Trade Secrets Have A Long History, JORDA SECRETS
(Oct. 25, 2007, 8:00 AM), http://www.jordasecrets.com/2007/10/jorda_on_trade_
secrets_have_a.html.
17. Id.
18. See Michael Risch, Why Do We Have Trade Secrets?, 11 MARQ. INTELL.
PROP. L. REV. 1, 35 (2007).
19. John R. Thomas, Cong. Research Serv., R41391, The Role of Trade Secrets
in Innovation Policy (2012).
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adopted in forty-seven states, Washington D.C., Puerto Rico, and the U.S.
Virgin Islands.20 The Act defines trade secrets as
information, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program,
device, method, technique, or process, that derives independent
economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally
known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means by,
other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure
or use, and is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the
circumstances to maintain its secrecy.21
On a general level, society accepts trade secret protection as a valuable
necessity. Even the most ardent supporters of mandatory disclosure for
fracturing chemicals recognize the benefit of trade secret laws and respect
the protection of a company’s proprietary information.22 The main
justifications for protecting trade secrets are rooted in economics,
philosophy, and populist opinion.23
The economic argument in favor of protecting trade secrets may be
the most important and persuasive: “[T]rade secrets relate to the economic
value of information; it stands to reason that economic analysis is the
appropriate way to justify the law.”24 Ideally, the legal protection of trade
secrets means companies spend less money trying to protect their secrets
and competitors likewise spend less money trying to acquire them.25 One
would hope that money normally spent on protection and misappropriation
would instead fund further research and development. Furthermore, the
economic value gleaned from legal protection incentivizes innovation:
“Trade secrets may establish incentives to innovate because they provide
a mechanism for firms to capture the benefits of their inventions.”26 In
other words, as long as oil and gas companies know that their hard-earned
information will be kept secret and out of the hands of competitors, they
will be more likely to keep investing in research, thus creating the potential
for increased efficiency and safety.27

20. Trade Secrets Act, UNIF. LAW COMM’N, http://www.uniformlaws.org/Act
.aspx?title=Trade+Secrets+Act [http://perma.cc/AJ4M-3NQK] (last visited Oct. 12,
2014) At the time of publication, North Carolina, Massachusetts and New York have
not adopted the United Trade Secrets Act.
21. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4) (1985).
22. See McFeeley, supra note 11.
23. See Risch, supra note 18, at 26.
24. Id. at 26–28.
25. See id. at 26.
26. THOMAS, supra note 19.
27. See id.; See also Risch, supra note 18, at 26.
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The second justification for trade secret protection revolves around the
principle that the person who puts in the time and money to research,
develop, or discover new information should be the one who owns it and,
therefore, reaps the economic benefit.28 While that exact idea is not
faithfully adhered to in modern trade secret law—trade secret protection
is provided only to the information for which the owner expends effort to
maintain secrecy—the notion manifests itself in the fact that trade secrets
are protected on some level.29
Finally, the populist argument for justifying trade secrets is based
upon the rationale that what the majority wants, the majority should get.
The majority’s clear desire for trade secret protection is illustrated by the
legal protections enacted in every state.30
B. Horizontal Hydraulic Fracturing
Hydraulic fracturing entails the use of a mixture of “fluid and material
to create or restore small fractures in a formation in order to stimulate
production from new and existing oil and natural gas wells. This creates
paths that increase the rate at which fluids can be produced from the
reservoir formations.”31 In combination with horizontal drilling, operators
of oil and natural gas wells undertake this process both to extend the life
of active wells and to reach oil and natural gas surpluses previously
thought to be unattainable.32
Horizontal hydraulic fracturing is a two-step process. The operating
company first drills a well “thousands of feet downward and then
gradually angle[s] out horizontally through the shale deposit.”33 By
branching the well out horizontally, the operator aims to reach the
maximum expanse of the shale formation.34 Once the well is drilled,
“[h]igh volumes of fracturing fluid are pumped deep into the well at
pressures sufficient to create or restore the small fractures in the reservoir
rock needed to make production possible.”35 The fracturing fluid is

28. See Risch, supra note 18, at 28–29.
29. See id.
30. See id. at 35.
31. FRACFOCUS, supra note 3.
32. Id.; See also Sorell E. Negro, The Thirst of Fracking: Regulating to Protect
the Linchpin of the Natural Gas Boom, 77 ALB. L. REV. 725, 725–26 (2013).
33. Drilling for Natural Gas in the Marcellus and Utica Shales: Environmental
Regulatory Basics, OHIO EPA (Jan. 2014), http://www.epa.ohio.gov/portals/0
/general%20pdfs/generalshale711.pdf [http://perma.cc/5DW8-HNMN].
34. See id.
35. FRACFOCUS, supra note 3.
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composed of a mixture of up to 99.5% water and proppants,36 combined with
a blend of chemical additives.37 The amount and type of chemicals used varies
depending on the well.38 Chemical additives are typically used to prevent
problems “such as bacterial build-up and the formation of scale, mineral
deposits and rust” during the production of the oil or gas in the well.39
Many types of chemical additives are used in these fluid mixtures,
including acids, corrosion inhibiters, and biocides.40 While thousands of
different possible chemicals may be used in the fracturing fluid, only a handful
are used more routinely than others.41 Many of the chemicals commonly used
in the additive portion of fracturing fluid mixtures are classified as hazardous
pollutants regulated by the Safe Drinking Water Act or Clean Air Act.42 They
may also be found in the Occupational Safety & Health Administration
(OSHA) database of regulated chemicals.43

36. “Proppants are sands or other granular substances injected into the formation
to hold or “prop” open shale formation fractures created by hydraulic fracturing.”
Hydraulic Fracturing Fluids, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY (Jun. 2004), http://www.epa
.gov/ogwdw/uic/pdfs/cbmstudy_attach_uic_ch04_hyd_frac_fluids.pdf.
37. See FRACFOCUS, supra note 3; See also Supplemental Generic
Environmental Impact Statement On The Oil, Gas and Solution Mining Regulatory
Program, N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION (Sept. 7 2011), § 5.4.3, http:
//www.dec.ny.gov/data/dmn/rdsgeisfull0911.pdf [http://perma.cc/FTT5-J5RJ].
38. See Chemical Use In Hydraulic Fracturing, F RAC F OCUS , http:
//fracfocus.org/water-protection/drilling-usage [http://perma.cc/5GT2-H9BV] (last
visited Oct. 13, 2014); See also Why Chemicals Are Used, FRACFOCUS, http:
//fracfocus.org/chemical-use/why-chemicals-are-used [http://perma.cc/X5EMWGH3] (last visited Oct. 13, 2014).
39. OHIO EPA, supra note 33.
40. See FRACFOCUS, Why Chemicals Are Used, supra note 38.
41. See id.
42. See FRACFOCUS, Chemicals Used in Hydraulic Fracturing, supra note 38.
43. See What Chemicals Are Used, FRACFOCUS, http://fracfocus.org/chemicaluse/what-chemicals-are-used [http://perma.cc/HT6S-963Z] (last visited Oct. 13,
2014); See also OSHA Occupational Chemical Database, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY &
HEALTH ADMIN., https://www.osha.gov/chemicaldata/ [https://perma.cc/RWD58SEG] (last visited Oct. 13, 2014).
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Companies invest millions of dollars to research and develop the
optimized mixtures for each shale formation.44 These complex mixtures
arguably45 give the individual companies a competitive advantage, making
them wary of other companies attempting to gain access to their investment.46
II. THE PUSH FOR FULL MANDATORY DISCLOSURE
The push for mandatory disclosure turns on the fear that these fluid
mixtures contain potentially hazardous chemicals. Proponents argue that
the public has a right to know the identity of these chemicals due to their
potentially hazardous effects on surrounding ecosystems and
communities.47 Advocates of laws requiring the disclosure of chemicals
used in fracturing fluid mixtures “maintain that public disclosure would
allow for health professionals to better respond to medical emergencies
involving human exposure to the chemicals; assist researchers in
conducting health studies on shale gas production; and permit regulators
and others to perform baseline water testing to track potential groundwater
contamination if it occurs.”48 Growing apprehension over the possibility
of subterranean water contamination, as well as above-ground exposure,
has driven concerned citizens to speak out against the amount of
information being withheld in states where hydraulic fracturing takes
place.49 Much of the public anxiety arises from the nature of chemicals
that are disclosed by companies, which in their own right “include some
that, based mainly on occupational studies or high-level exposures in
laboratory animals, have been shown to cause effects such as
carcinogenicity, mutagenicity, reproductive toxicity, neurotoxicity or
organ damage.”50 Such harmful effects only come as the result of an actual

44. See John D. Furlow & John R. Hays Jr., Disclosure With Protection of Trade
Secrets Comes To The Hydraulic Fracturing Revolution, 7 TEX. J. OIL GAS & ENERGY
L. 289, 306 (2011).
45. The point is arguable because it is possible for companies to all independently
develop and use the same product or information without the trade secret protection
of that product being compromised and without any of the competing companies even
knowing they are doing so. See Trade Secrets, W ORKMAN N YDEGGER ,
http://www.wnlaw.com/ip-information/trade-secrets/[http://perma.cc/EQC5-JRWS]
(last visited Jan. 18, 2015).
46. See Furlow & Hays Jr., supra note 44, at 306.
47. See McFeeley, supra note 11.
48. See Brandon J. Murrill & Adam Vann, Cong. Research Serv., R42461,
Hydraulic Fracturing: Chemical Disclosure Requirements 1 (2012).
49. See Hannah Wiseman, Trade Secrets, Disclosure, and Dissent in a Fracturing
Energy Revolution, 111 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 1, 8–9 (2011).
50. N.Y. State Dep’t of Envtl. Conservation , supra note 37, at §5.4.
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exposure;51 however, because the potential risk is so great, advocates for
full disclosure question the risks associated with the chemical additives
the companies are not willing to disclose.
Meanwhile, some of the companies employing these mixtures have
been adamant about protecting their alleged proprietary information.52
Nine natural gas companies boldly refused to respond to a 2010 letter sent
by the EPA requesting disclosure of the chemicals being used in their
fracturing fluids for incorporation into a study of the potential impact and
harm the fluids cause.53 Particularly, Halliburton—one of the more vocal
opponents to the mandatory disclosure regulations—claimed that “it spent
‘tens of millions of dollars’ across five years researching new fracturing
fluids . . . [and] that public disclosure of its proprietary formulas could cost
it $375 million.”54 In almost direct response to the argument that trade
secret protection creates an incentive to innovate, “[c]ompanies also have
argued that too much disclosure also could hinder efforts to develop new,
less toxic fracturing chemicals. Oil and natural gas companies say they
have no incentive to invest in research if their innovations will simply be
given away.”55
State legislatures have responded almost in unison to this push for
mandatory disclosure by adopting disclosure regulations. At the time of
publication of this comment, twenty-two states have adopted regulations
regarding the disclosure of fracturing fluid chemicals.56 However, these
regulations differ from state to state in terms of what material they actually
require to be disclosed, and they are generally company friendly.57 Of the
twenty-two states mandating disclosure, Wyoming leads the way with the
most comprehensive requirements regarding trade secret protection.58
The disclosure movement has also led to a collective response from
the oil and gas industry by way of FracFocus, a website where “companies
51. Walter Tsou, The Big Secret? Fracking Fluids, PHYSICIANS FOR SOC.
RESPONSIBILITY, http://www.psr.org/environment-and-health/environmental-healthpolicy-institute/responses/the-big-secret-fracking-fluids.html [http://perma.cc/9FGVDCHR] (last visited Oct. 13, 2014).
52. Proprietary information is considered another term for trade secret. This
information consists simply of that content which a company seeks to keep
confidential.
53. See Wiseman, supra note 49, at 2.
54. Mike Soragahn, Hydraulic Fracturing: Two-thirds of Frack Disclosures
Omit 'Secrets', E&E P UB . LLC (Sept. 26, 2012), http://www.eenews.net
/stories/1059970474 [http://perma.cc/B5HG-QVJA].
55. Id.
56. See ORRICK, supra note 9.
57. See Hall, supra note 6, at 406–07; Poe Legette et al., Trade Secrets and the
Regulation of Hydraulic Fracturing: Toward a Global Perspective—Pt 1, 4 INT’L
ENERGY L. REV. 154, 158–67 (2013).
58. See id.
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[can] voluntarily disclose the composition of fracturing fluid used anywhere
in the United States on a well-by-well basis.”59 Two organizations, the
Ground Water Protection Council and the Interstate Oil and Gas Compact
Commission, manage the website.60 The purpose of FracFocus is to enable
direct disclosure of information from the companies themselves.61 While the
concept behind the website is novel, the actual functioning of the site has its
flaws. A recent study by the Harvard Law School gave the site “a failing grade
as a disclosure tool,”62 underlining the often inaccurate or incomplete quality
of FracFocus reports and the fact that the information can only be reviewed
one well at a time.63 Moreover, concerns have arisen over discrepancies as to
what was actually being claimed as a trade secret.64
While the newly enacted disclosure regulations represent a step in the
right direction, trade secret protections still obstruct necessary transparency to
some extent. The oil and gas industry points to the EPA’s TRI as one
regulation allowing companies to withhold the specific identity of chemicals
they deem to qualify as trade secret information.65 Advocates of disclosure
contend that states have given the oil and natural gas industry “special
treatment” by not requiring any immediate oversight over trade secret claims
while requiring such oversight in other areas.66 Indeed, both the federal and
state levels provide similar regulations that require other industries to disclose
proprietary information to regulators, which is then kept confidential from the
public.67 While the industry stands behind the protections of the TRI, other
federal laws—such as the Clean Air Act or the Food and Drug Act—do
require the disclosure of proprietary information to regulatory officials who
maintain confidentiality as to the general public.68 For example, Louisiana
requires coal mining companies seeking to perform exploration or
development processes to obtain a permit beforehand. As part of this
59. Hall, supra note 6, at 407.
60. About Us, FRACFOCUS, http://fracfocus.org/welcome [http://perma.cc/9G2L
-GK8Z] (last visited Oct. 13, 2014).
61. See id.
62. See Katie Colaneri, Transparency about fracking chemicals remains elusive,
STATEIMPACT (Aug. 7, 2014, 1:04 PM), http://stateimpact.npr.org/pennsylvania/2014
/08/07/transparency-about-fracking-chemicals-remains-illusive/ [http://perma.cc
/TWM7-Y64R].
63. See id.
64. See id.
65. See Soragahn, supra note 54; See also infra Part III.B.
66. See McFeeley, supra note 11.
67. See Hall, supra note 6, at 422 n.174 (citing several federal laws such as
the Clean Air Act, Food and Drug Act, Resource Conservation and Recovery Act,
and the Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act
as examples of laws requiring full disclosure of information with protection for
trade secrets from public access).
68. See Hall, supra note 6, at 421–22.
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permitting procedure, Louisiana protects from public view any confidential
information submitted to the Office of Conservation.69 The oil and gas
industry has generally opposed implementing similar processes for the
exploration and development of oil and natural gas energy sources.
That is not to say that the oil and gas industry is in full agreement on the
issue of disclosure. One of the largest oilfield services companies, Baker
Hughes, answered the call for full disclosure of its own accord, declaring that
it would begin disclosing the identities of all of the ingredients contained in
its fracturing fluids.70 Baker Hughes contends that by disclosing only the
identities of the chemicals employed, and not the actual amounts used, the
company can still protect its proprietary interests and promote “a balance that
increases public trust while encouraging commercial innovation.”71
Still, whether Baker Hughes actually discloses any of these chemical
additives depends on the permission of the company’s customers.72 These
clients may have a considerable stake in the matter of disclosure and may not,
for their own business purposes, want a full release of information regarding
potentially hazardous fluid ingredients. Although it is unlikely that the entire
industry will follow in the footsteps of Baker Hughes, the company’s action
can be interpreted as a sign that the industry is, at some level, open to the kind
of transparency desired by proponents of disclosure.73
III. THE CURRENT REGULATION
Currently, both Louisiana and the EPA regulate chemical disclosure in
regards to oil and natural gas drilling. While these regulations are worthwhile
in theory, they ultimately prove to be futile against overbearing trade secret
protections.

69. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:912 (2014); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:916
(2014); See also Hall, supra note 6, at 422 n.174.
70. See Michael Winter, Major Firm To Disclose Fracking Chemicals, USA
Today (Apr. 5, 2014, 3:28 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/2014/04/24
/fracking-fluid-disclosure/8117133/ [http://perma.cc/D7QS-J3UN].
71. Id.
72. See id.
73. Baker Hughes is not the only company in the oil and natural gas industry
to support the disclosure movement. The CEO of Breitling Energy Corporation
has been another vocal supporter of full disclosure. See Chris Faulkner,
Regulator’s Have to Require Drillers to Come Clean on What’s In Fracking
Fluids, THE PATRIOT NEWS (Dec. 24, 2014, 2:00 PM), http://www.pennlive.com
/opinion/2014/12/regulators_have_to_require_dri.html [http://perma.cc
/3TND-K5QX].
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A. Louisiana
In accordance with the push for mandatory disclosure, Louisiana adopted
a regulation requiring disclosure of the chemicals contained in the additive
portion of the mixture used in wells no later than twenty days after the
completion of “hydraulic fracturing stimulation operations.”74 Specific to the
disclosure of chemicals used in the additive portion of the fluid, the regulation
requires the operator to disclose a list of additives used, the specific trade name
of each additive type, a list of chemical ingredients along with their associated
Chemical Abstracts Service (CAS) numbers,75 and the maximum
concentration of each respective ingredient.76
While a cursory glance may lead the reader to believe the disclosure
requirements are comprehensive and detailed, the regulation also includes a
generous trade secret exemption. The operator may withhold the “specific
identity of [any] chemical ingredient and the chemical ingredient’s associated
CAS number” from a disclosure report if it deems that ingredient proprietary
information.77 Thus, the operator will only need to disclose the “chemical
family associated with the ingredient[,] . . . a statement that a claim of trade
secret protection has been made . . . [and] the contact information of the entity
claiming trade secret protection.”78 The regulation provides no express
requirement that the claim be evaluated by a regulatory agency prior to an
explicit challenge.79 The regulation also allows this disclosure report to be
submitted through the FracFocus website or a similar service, rendering
reporting to a Louisiana state regulatory agency unnecessary.80 Without a
specific challenge to a company’s trade secret claim, the claim is presumed to
be valid.
The actual standard Louisiana requires a company to meet as to what
constitutes a fracturing fluid trade secret, is promulgated in the Emergency
Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA).81 In order for
information to be considered confidential, a company must prove that it
provides a competitive advantage and has not been disclosed to anyone other
74. LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 43, pt. XIX, § 118 (2013).
75. CAS REGISTRY and CAS Registry Number FAQs, CAS, http://www
.cas.org/content/chemical-substances/faqs [http://perma.cc/BM8T-7BVY] (last
visited Oct. 13, 2014) A CAS number is a unique identifier for a chemical substance
tied to an extensive registry.
76. LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 43, pt. XIX, § 118 (2013).
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 43, pt. XIX, § 118 (2013) (While Louisiana has
adopted the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, the state cites to the trade secret factors
of the EPCRA in its fracking disclosure regulation).
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than government personnel, employees of the company, or anyone bound by
a confidentiality agreement.82 Essentially, this trade secret standard mimics
the UTSA.83 While this standard is applied in the majority of states, the point
of contention lies in its unsupervised application.
Equally problematic, the only chemicals requiring disclosure under the
regulation are those that are identified as hazardous by OSHA,84 meaning that
they “pose a wide range of health hazards (such as irritation, sensitization, and
carcinogenicity) and physical hazards (such as flammability, corrosion, and
reactivity).”85 While the list of chemicals OSHA deems to be hazardous is
extensive, whether it actually includes all dangerous chemicals is debatable.86
To be identified as hazardous by OSHA, studies must show the chemical to
be dangerous in a workplace setting; if no such study has been performed on
the particular chemical, OSHA assumes it to be non-hazardous.87
The lack of pre-treatment reporting presents another issue with the
Louisiana regulation. While post-treatment reporting provides more accurate
information as to what exactly was included in the fluid used,88 the regulation
does not allow for pre-treatment baseline groundwater testing.89 The absence
of actual oversight at the time the trade secret claims are made is also
alarming. With such a broad protection afforded to these companies, many
have great opportunity to exploit and circumvent actual disclosure of
potentially harmful chemical additives.90 Thus, the regulation provides a false
82. 42 U.S.C. §11042(b) (2014).
83. See supra note 17 and accompanying text; while the exact language may
differ, ultimately, the same premise is behind the standards.
84. LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 43, pt. XIX, § 118 (2013).
85. Chemical Hazards and Toxic Substances, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY &
H EALTH A DMIN ., https://www.osha.gov/SLTC/hazardoustoxicsubstances/
[https://perma.cc/Q6YX-D92U] (last visited Oct. 13, 2014).
86. See McFeeley, supra note 11.
87. See id.
88. The actual makeup of the fluid mixture may be adapted during the process
to better suit the well.
89. See Baseline Water Qua lity Testing, W ATE R S HE D C OUNC IL ,
http://www.watershedcouncil.org/learn/hydraulic-fracturing/baseline-testing/
(last visited Jan. 17, 2015); see also Groundwater Quality & Testing, FRACFOCUS,
https://fracfocus.org/groundwater-protection/groundwater-quality-testing
[https://perma.cc/7J9U-W47Z] (last visited Jan. 17, 2015) (baseline testing of the
groundwater is a process whereby samples are taken from the nearby wells to
determine the amount of chemicals in the water prior to the hydraulic fracturing
process taking place. This data can then be used to compare to post-treatment
testing to determine whether any contamination has occurred to the water as a
result of the fracturing).
90. While far from perfect, it is worth noting that the current regulation in
Louisiana exceeds its counterparts in other states by leaps and bounds. In
particular, Utah and North Dakota have enacted regulations with little actual
guidance of what must be disclosed beyond the most basic report to the FracFocus
website. There is seemingly very little that is actually required to be disclosed, the
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sense of transparency. Because the Louisiana regulation emulates the
language and process of the TRI, it correspondingly mimics the same benefits
and shortcomings.
B. The EPCRA, TRI, and Louisiana
Section 313 of the EPCRA establishes the TRI as “part of a new approach
to environmental protection.”91 The creation of the TRI program came in
response to growing public concern following disasters at chemical plants in
India and West Virginia.92 Consequently, the EPA constructed the EPCRA to
“support and promote emergency planning and to provide the public with
information about releases of toxic chemicals in their community,”93 with the
TRI tracking “the management of certain toxic chemicals that may pose a
threat to human health and the environment. Facilities in the United States in
different industry sectors94 must report annually how much of each chemical
is released into the environment and/or managed through recycling, energy
recovery, and treatment.”95
The various states’ fracturing fluid disclosure regulations closely
resemble the TRI. Generally speaking, the TRI program requires disclosure
of chemicals “That cause [c]ancer or other chronic human health effects;
Significant adverse acute human health effects; [and] Significant adverse
environmental effects.”96

reports to the FracFocus website are not mandated to be filed before sixty days
post-treatment, and no oversight whatsoever concerning trade secret claims is
afforded by the respective regulations. See Legette, supra note 56, at 159–60 (for
a brief discussion on the Utah and North Dakota regulations).
91. Learn About The Toxics Release Inventory, ENVTL. P ROT. AGENCY,
http://www2.epa.gov/toxics-release-inventory-tri-program/learn-about-toxicsrelease-inventory [http://perma.cc/XJ78-ZXKE] (last visited Oct. 13, 2014).
92. See id.; See also Allen Pusey, Dec. 3, 1984: Bhopal Chemical Leak Kills
Thousands in India, ABA J OURNAL (Dec. 1, 2012, 6:50 AM), http://www
.abajournal.com/magazine/article/dec._3_1984_bhopal_chemical_leak_kills_tho
usands_in_india/ [http://perma.cc/V7A6-8P7W] (discussing the plant leak in
India which resulted in thousands of deaths as a result of chemical exposure); Ben
A. Franklin, Toxic Cloud Leaks At Carbide Plant In West Virginia, NY TIMES
(Aug. 12, 1985), http://www.nytimes.com/1985/08/12/us/toxic-cloud-leaks-atcarbide-plant-in-west-virginia.html [http://perma.cc/3Q9F-4U49] (discussing the
plant leak in West Virginia which exposed hundreds of nearby residents to
potentially harmful chemicals).
93. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 91.
94. Id. (“[F]acilities that report to TRI are typically larger facilities involved
in manufacturing, metal mining, electric power generation, chemical
manufacturing and hazardous waste treatment . . . .”).
95. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 91.
96. Id.

440

LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES

[Vol. IV

Louisiana could do worse than trying to replicate the established system
of the TRI. Instead of simply creating standards and rules on how to handle
these hazardous materials, a process like the TRI “creates a strong incentive
for companies to improve environmental performance.”97 Requiring
disclosure to the EPA of materials not protected as trade secrets also makes
this information publically available. As such, public scrutiny increases and
companies are encouraged to research and develop safer alternatives. The
level of disclosure required also places the burden on the companies to show
that what they are claiming is indeed a trade secret.
Studies show that the level of substantiation required for the TRI serves
as a deterrent to companies making trade secret claims and vastly reduces the
amount of claims actually made.98 It would be reasonable to assume that this
benefit applies equally to the Louisiana regulation. However, while the TRI
records reflect only seven claims made out of thousands of reports over the
course of a year,99 the results of a quick search for Louisiana wells on
FracFocus shows proprietary information being withheld from the first twenty
wells listed.100 The EPA has not required participants of the oil and gas
extraction industry to report to the TRI, stating that “most of the information
required under TRI is already reported by producers to state agencies that
make it publicly available. Also, TRI reporting from the hundreds of
thousands of oil and gas sites would overwhelm the existing EPA reporting
system.”101
Despite its noted benefits, the TRI system is not without its shortcomings.
For instance, the EPCRA allows companies to claim trade secret protection
when filing their TRI disclosure reports. However, only the exact identity of
the chemical may be hidden; the company must provide the generic class or
family for each chemical.102 Moreover, no established process exists for
evaluating the trade secret claims at the time they are made. Although any
third party may challenge a trade secret claim, the EPA neither reviews the
97. The Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act, ENVTL.
PROT. AGENCY, http://www2.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2013-08/documents
/epcra_fact_sheet.pdf [http://perma.cc/9BTU-LB8Z] (last visited Oct. 13, 2014).
98. See Sheila A. Ferguson, et al., Influence of CBI Requirements on TSCA
Implementation, Hampshire Research Associates, Inc. (March 1992); Richard
Denison, Worse than we thought: Decades of out-of-control CBI claims under
TSCA, E NVTL. D EFENSE F UND (Feb. 12, 2010), http://blogs.edf.org/health
/2010/02/12/worse-than-we-thought-decades-of-out-of-control-cbi-claims-under
-tsca/ [http://perma.cc/LKF8-33M2].
99. Denison, supra note 98.
100. Find a Well, FRACFOCUS, http://www.fracfocusdata.org/DisclosureSearch
/SearchResults.aspx [http://perma.cc/MG26-TAKR] (last visited Oct. 13, 2014).
101. Chemicals & Public Disclosure, F RAC F OCUS , http://fracfocus.org
/chemical-use/chemicals-public-disclosure [http://perma.cc/8NYP-XLEY] (last
visited Oct. 13, 2014).
102. See ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 97.
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claim nor rules on its validity unless petitioned to do so,103 meaning that no
oversight exists absent an explicit challenge of the claim.
IV. THE CASE FOR UPFRONT SUBSTANTIATION AND AN IMMEDIATE
EVALUATION PROCESS OF TRADE SECRET CLAIMS
At present, it is simply too easy for a company to make a claim that
information is a trade secret and effectively dodge regulation. With little
provision for affirmative review procedures, the present system bears the risk
of a proliferation of overbroad claims. A new system must be put into effect
to serve the best interests of community health, environmental protection, and
the oil and gas industry alike.
A. No Oversight
The major issue with the current system is the absence of oversight
reviewing what companies actually claim to be proprietary information
notwithstanding explicit challenge after the fact. In an industry frequently
using potentially harmful chemicals on such a grand scale, the lack of
oversight becomes a fundamental problem. Even absent ill intent on the part
of the companies, over-claiming trade secret protection on these disclosure
reports could result from simple error. Nonetheless, without a process to
review claims at the time they are made, companies may—intentionally or
unintentionally—claim protection for information that should not qualify as a
trade secret.104
The possibility for intentionally overbroad claims, however, becomes
particularly evident when dealing with the hydraulic fracturing process.
Because of the heightened public scrutiny and potential liability tied to the
hazardous chemicals in play, companies may decide it easier to “over-claim
trade secrets to escape responsibility” since the lack of oversight implicitly
allows it.105 With a process in place to evaluate these claims at the time they
are made, this concern will be effectively put to rest. Instead, under the present
regulation, these companies essentially get a “free pass to avoid disclosure
requirements when a company claims trade secrets are involved.”106

103. Id.
104. Comments On Proposed 20 AAC 25.283 - Fracing, U. TEX. REG. OVERSIGHT
GRP. (Apr. 1, 2013), http://www.utexas.edu/law/wp/wp-content/uploads/centers
/energy/UTROG-Comment-on-AOGCC-Rules.pdf.
105. Id.
106. See McFeeley, supra note 11.
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B. Ability to Challenge Claims
To mitigate the potential for overbroad claims, the state must set up an
initial review process to be conducted at the time that claims are made. Under
this proposed system, an automatic “challenge” of the claim by a state
regulatory agency will take place, which will lead to less trepidation on the
part of the public regarding whether companies are making legitimate trade
secret claims. The approval of the state agency will, in turn, decrease the
public’s desire to bring third party challenges. Both the state and third parties
will be more able to challenge trade secret claims if oil and natural gas
companies disclose to the regulatory agency the information they believe to
be protected.107 In the case where the claim is still challenged by a third party,
the proposed scheme will lead to a more efficient process because the state
will already have the information necessary to make the decision; ruling on
the challenge will be as simple as conducting a de novo review of the
information by the state agency.
C. Transparency
In the case of hydraulic fracturing, the industry’s ideal response to
advocates for disclosure will be to promote transparency for transparency’s
sake. While the hydraulic fracturing boom has led to a figurative
“boogeyman” for opponents of the oil and gas industry to publicly attack, no
significant studies actually evidence severe environmental defects stemming
from the fracturing process.108 This void does not suggest the nonexistence of
potential harm—the use of thousands of gallons of potentially hazardous
chemicals could cause significant damage in the case that some mishap
occurs.109 Still, the exaggerated risks of fracturing in public forums means that
advocating for broader disclosure is in the industry’s best interest.110 A
comprehensive system requiring full disclosure of the chemical identities used
in fracturing will “defang the boogeyman,” as one drilling company CEO has
so eloquently stated.111
107. See Hall, supra note 6, at 418.
108. Chris Faulkner, FRACKING: The Future is Transparency, BREITLING
E NERGY (Jun. 30, 2014), http://www.breitlingenergy.com/fracking-futuretransparency-drill/ [http://perma.cc/53WF-4S37].
109. See Seamus McGraw, Pennsylvania Fracking Accident: What Went
Wrong, POPULAR MECHANICS (Apr. 21, 2011 1:00 PM), http://www.popular
mechanics.com/science/energy/coal-oil-gas/pennsylvania-fracking-accidentwhat-went-wrong-5598621 (describing one incident that occurred in
Pennsylvania, where a leak in the well led to “thousands of gallons of chemical
laced water flowing out beyond its protective berms”).
110. Faulkner, supra note 108.
111. Id.

2016]

TRANSPARENCY AND THE PROTECTION OF TRADE SECRETS

443

Congress has determined that “[e]very American has the right to know
the chemicals to which they may be exposed in their daily living.”112 While
the EPA has not extended the TRI specifically to the oil and gas industry—
instead allowing the states to sidestep the EPCRA with their own
regulations for fracturing fluid disclosures—the intent behind the EPCRA
should be read into these state regulations. Congress established the
EPCRA, in part, to increase public awareness of the chemicals used and
potentially released into the environment.113 By enacting the EPCRA,
Congress secured the public’s right to know the identity of the hazardous
and toxic substances being used in their vicinity.
That policy falls in line with Justice Brandeis’s famous line, “sunlight
is said to be the best of disinfectants.”114 In Justice Brandeis’s opinion,
great benefits arise from transparency as “[p]ublicity is justly commended
as a remedy for social and industrial diseases.”115 Justice Brandeis opined
that complete transparency in business dealings would benefit society as a
whole.116 While his ultimate objective of full and absolute disclosure with
no protected or confidential information, overreaches the present proposal,
the underlying idea remains persuasive. The more transparent oil and gas
companies become in disclosing what chemicals they are using in
hydraulic fracturing treatment, the less adamant the calls of industry
detractors will be.
D. Wait-and-See Approach
Put simply, no adequate rationale explains why a disclosure regulation
should take a “wait-and-see” approach to trade secret claims. Any
argument favoring a system that permits trade secret claims to stand
without oversight must logically succumb to the argument for a system
mandating oversight. When it comes to balancing the potential health and
safety of the public with the monetary desires of the oil and gas industry,
the public’s well-being must always triumph.
The protection of the public brings to the forefront the precautionary
principle, which demands that, “[w]hen an activity raises threats of harm
to the environment or human health, precautionary measures should be
112. Learn About Your Right to Know, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www
.epa.gov/epahome/r2k.htm [http://perma.cc/V3JP-3KAC] (last visited Oct. 13,
2014).
113. Id.
114. LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS
USE IT 92 (Frederick A. Stokes Co. 8th ed. 1932) Other People’s Money is often
cited as a source for any scholar discussing transparency in the business industry
as well as in the government.
115. Id.
116. See id.
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taken even if some cause and effect relationships are not fully established
scientifically.”117 Under this principle, a society valuing transparency calls for
a regulation requiring full disclosure despite the lack of studies proving severe
harm directly resulting from fracturing or the chemicals used during
treatment.
V. WYOMING AS AN EXAMPLE
In attempting to solve the conundrum of what level of disclosure should
be required for fracturing fluid chemicals, a balance of the interests of the
public at large and that of the companies must be met. While the task is
certainly daunting, a model process is already in place in Wyoming. As such,
Louisiana can look to Wyoming as an example that it should emulate.118
In 2010, Wyoming became the first state to enact a mandatory disclosure
regulation for hydraulic fracturing fluid chemicals.119 Wyoming’s regulation
is different from its Louisiana counterpart in four ways: (1) It requires
companies to make both pre- and post-treatment reports; (2) The chemicals
for which reporting is required are not limited to only those regulated by
OSHA; (3) The companies are required to disclose the identity of the
chemicals beyond just their generic chemical families; and (4) The regulation
requires that a trade secret claim be evaluated at the time it is made.120
While the Louisiana regulation only requires a company to make a
disclosure report within twenty days after the end of the hydraulic fracturing
process, Wyoming requires this report be made both before and after the
treatment process.121 Reporting prior to the treatment process allows for
baseline groundwater testing, which in turn aids in evaluating for
contamination.122 Wyoming also requires the companies to report posttreatment, which thereby increases the accuracy of the reports as the actual
fluid mixtures may be altered during the fracturing process.123 Companies are
required to give the Wyoming Oil and Gas Conservation Commission
(WOGCC) a complete list of the chemicals that they plan to use for the
specific well in the pre-treatment report and then supplement that information
with the actual amount of each chemical used in the post-treatment report.124
117. Precautionary Principle, SCIENCE & ENVT’L HEALTH NETWORK (Jan. 26,
1998), http://www.sehn.org/wing.html [http://perma.cc/ET23-QSJT].
118. Wyoming is currently the only state carrying out oversight at the level of
implementation necessary in Louisiana and therefore provides the ideal
foundation for the proposed scheme.
119. See Hall, supra note 6, at 406.
120. tit. 55, ch. 3, WYO. CODE R. § 45(d) (LexisNexis Dec 2012).
121. Id.
122. See Hall, supra note 6, at 424.
123. tit. 55, ch. 3, WYO. CODE R. § 45(d) (LexisNexis Dec 2012).
124. Id.; See also Legette, supra note 56, at 159.
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At the time the report is made, the “party claiming trade secret
protection must justify and document the nature and extent of the
proprietary information.”125 The WOGCC then compares what the
company claims to be protected proprietary information to the trade secret
standard set forth in the Wyoming Public Records Act (WPRA) and makes
a determination as to whether the information is indeed a trade secret
deserving protection.126 If the WOGCC agrees with the company that the
information is indeed a trade secret, the information is then kept on record
and deemed confidential by the agency.127 Although the information is
now under the state’s control, it is under no circumstances subject to a
public records request.128
The standard for qualifying a trade secret under the WPRA is more
exclusive than the Louisiana standard. Recently, this question—
specifically regarding whether the chemical identities of the fracturing
fluid formulas constituted a trade secret—came before the Wyoming
Supreme Court.129 The Court determined that the WPRA establishes a
more narrow definition of trade secrets than does the UTSA.130 Thus,
under the WPRA, a trade secret “is a secret, commercially valuable plan,
formula, [or] process . . . that is used for the making, preparing,
compounding, or processing of trade commodities and that can be said to
be the end product of either innovation or substantial effort, with a direct
relationship between the trade secret and the productive process.”131
According to the Wyoming Supreme Court, this definition is designed to
be more in line with the intent behind the WPRA and, following in the
footsteps of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), prefers transparency
over opacity in most cases.132 However, Wyoming’s definition may not be
the most appropriate for the regulation of fracturing fluids. Whether
individual chemical identities would be considered trade secrets under the
WPRA definition is unclear133 so its use falls short of perfect in a situation
seeking to protect such information while still requiring its disclosure.
In theory, the situation created by the Wyoming statute is ideal—the
public gets the transparency they want through full disclosure to a
regulatory agency, while the companies get the deserved protection for
125. See Brandon J. Murrill & Adam Vann, Cong. Research Serv., R42461,
Hydraulic Fracturing: Chemical Disclosure Requirements 9 n.62 (2012).
126. See id.
127. tit. 55, ch. 3, WYO. CODE R. § 45(d) (LexisNexis Dec 2012).
128. WYO. STAT. ANN. §16-4-203(d)(v).
129. See Powder River Basin Res. Council v. Wyoming Oil & Gas
Conservation Comm’n, 320 P.3d 222 (2014).
130. See id. at 233.
131. Id. at 234.
132. See id. at 231.
133. See id. at 234–35.
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their proprietary information. Still, this statute is not without its own faults.
Questions remain, however, as to how lenient the trade secret standard
being applied by the state agency is and how much assessment is actually
going into these trade secret claims in practice.134 Another problem
persists regarding the burden imposed on the state agency as a result of
increased resource expenditure.135
VI. SOLUTION
The solution to the glaring hole in the Louisiana fracturing fluid
disclosure regulation is clear: Louisiana must adopt a comprehensive
scheme similar to that enacted in Wyoming. Instead of a general, posttreatment report provided through the FracFocus website, Louisiana
should require companies to make both pre- and post-treatment reports to
a state regulatory agency. The pre-treatment report will contain full
disclosure of every chemical ingredient a company believes it will use for
that well, while the post-treatment report should include what chemicals
were actually used in the fluid, as well as the concentration of each
individual chemical. Companies will still be able to claim trade secret
protection for proprietary information, since Louisiana protects trade
secret information from public records requests.136 Instead of adopting an
approach that only questions and evaluates trade secret claims if they are
explicitly challenged, the state regulatory agency should automatically
assess claims at the time they are made. The trade secret standard applied
to disclosures should remain the same, as the current standard is well
recognized by most states and federal agencies.
The Louisiana Office of Conservation will assume the responsibility
of assessing fracturing fluid trade secret claims. Currently, the Office of
Conservation is “charged with . . . [the] statutory responsibility to regulate
the exploration and production of oil, gas and other hydrocarbons and
lignite . . . and to protect public safety and the environment from oilfield
waste, including regulation of underground injection and disposal
practices.”137 The oversight of hydraulic fracturing fluid trade secret
134. Id. at 222.
135. See Hall, supra note 6, at 416; See also Lynda Edwards, Audit: Louisiana
Fails To Plug And Police Abandoned Wells, THE ADVERTISER (Jun. 3, 2014 9:21
PM), http://www.theadvertiser.com/story/news/local/louisiana/2014/06/03/auditlouisiana-fails-plug-police-abandoned-wells/9938581/ [http://perma.cc/KW8RUT6S] (providing a brief summary of the current understaffing issues facing the
Louisiana Office of Conservation).
136. La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 44:3.2 (2014).
137. Office of Conservation, DEP’T OF NATURAL RES., http://dnr.louisiana.gov
/index.cfm?md=pagebuilder&tmp=home&pid=46 [http://perma.cc/2MGQ5ER2] (last visited Nov. 5, 2014).
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claims thus naturally falls under the Office of Conservation’s charge, as it
is in the purview of the Office’s other duties and activities.
This process will limit the frequency of both intentional and
unintentional frivolous claims. From a policy perspective, immediate
evaluation surpasses the “wait-and-see” approach of withholding claim
evaluation until a third party challenge. A proactive approach effectively
eliminates mistaken trade secret claims that occur on the companies’ end
and serves as a surefire deterrent to any company attempting to
intentionally circumvent the system.
Arguments against instituting this kind of comprehensive agency
review in Louisiana center on the overall cost on state resources, the
increased cost to oil and gas companies, and the possibility of inept, rushed
processing by the overburdened state agency. Colorado is one state that
has been vocal about its doubts concerning a fracturing regulation that
mandates immediate oversight of trade secret claims. State leaders cited
budget and resource concerns, along with fears of the heightened risk of
inadvertent disclosure of protected information innately flowing from the
increased number of eyes interfacing with the information.138
While it is true that the allocation of more state resources to the Office
of Conservation will be necessary, funding can be amassed by requiring
companies who wish to file a trade secret claim to pay a specified fee.
Although oil and natural gas companies may balk at paying a fee, the
public interests must be protected over the monetary interests of
companies who already benefit financially from hydraulic fracturing.
Furthermore, the risk of exposure of trade secret information does not
compel rejection of the system, as legal repercussions are in place to
punish perpetrators and prevent such violations. While these arguments
are facially legitimate, the deterrent effect of this system against both
intentional misuse of trade secret protection by companies and
unintentional mistakes must be prioritized on the grounds that the
hydraulic fracturing process entails the use of thousands of gallons of
potentially hazardous chemicals.
CONCLUSION
The rise of the horizontal hydraulic fracturing process promises great
economic gains for the future. Nevertheless, it is clear that the increased
use of this process brings with it an abundance of the potentially hazardous
chemicals inherently implicated therein. For this reason, disclosure of the
138. See Hall, supra note 6, at 416; Legette, supra note 56, at 158; Order
No.1R-114 (December 13, 2011), codified at 2 COLO. CODE REGS. § 404-1
(LexisNexis 2013).
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actual identity of the chemicals used is necessary. However, such
disclosure should not come at the expense of the companies who have
invested millions of dollars and countless hours into developing the most
efficient and proper mixtures for each well. Although Louisiana has
attempted to take a step toward transparency regarding hydraulic
fracturing fluid ingredients, a loophole nonetheless persists. Under the
present system, companies can too easily circumvent actual disclosure of
the chemicals and corresponding concentrations that they use for the
fracturing fluid. While striking a balance between company interests and
the level of disclosure sought by public advocates is a delicate task,
Wyoming’s existing scheme furnishes an efficacious model for addressing
this issue. By adopting a comprehensive scheme similar to Wyoming’s,
Louisiana can satisfy proponents of disclosure while still keeping the
proprietary information of the companies confidential.
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